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1. Introduction 
By providing a safe income after retirement from active work, social security 
systems have contributed substantially to the reduction of poverty among the 
elderly in developed countries. The long-term costs of these social benefits are, 
however, less obvious and are not yet fully understood. They arise from various 
effects of social security systems on labour markets and private capital formation 
leading to possible reductions in future growth and real wealth. While the analysis 
of possible labour markets effects of the existing pay-as-you-go systems of old-
age social security has boomed over the last two decades, the possible capital 
market and real wealth effects are still less well known. We will underline in this 
paper the existence and significance of the latter effects. They should be taken into 
account, when reforms of the existing social security systems are being discussed. 
 
The pioneering study by Feldstein (1974) sparked the debate on whether or not 
transfer-based social security retirement benefits influence the saving behaviour of 
individuals. Following Ricardian equivalence theory as put forward by Barro 
(1974), there is no reason to expect any substitution in household wealth 
formation if the retirement transfers are financed by (lump sum) social security 
taxes. Other studies focusing on the life-cycle model of individual decision-
making (e.g., Feldstein and Pellechio 1979; Bernheim 1987) came to the result 
that public old-age security can completely offset private household saving. 
Empirical investigations that so far have tested the existence and the magnitude of 
such offset effects had to overcome serious measurement problems and provided 
rather mixed results. 
 
Our study contributes to this debate by focusing on evidence from Germany 
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where the public pension system has a long history going back to the end of the 
19th century, but has also experienced a series of institutional shocks due to the 
two world wars, deep economic crises and the division of the country. Following 
Gale (1995; 1998) we try to capture several measurement biases that can veil the 
true interaction between social security benefits and private capital formation. 
Based on German panel data between 1984 and 1999, we are able to estimate 
household lifetime incomes and then derive a robust estimate of the private saving 
offset effects of social security retirement benefits. Our estimate is much lower 
than expected from pure life-cycle considerations (and thus closer to the 
predictions from Ricardian equivalence theory) and also less than comparable 
estimates for the US and the UK. This result is thus another proof of a particular 
“German savings puzzle” (Börsch-Supan et. al. 2000, Börsch-Supan 2001) which 
might be due to market imperfections and/or bounded rational behavior. 
Our study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the debate on the real 
wealth effects of old-age social security, the possible measurements biases and 
previous empirical findings. In Section 3 we explain our data sample. Section 4 
discusses the econometric specification and the results of our empirical test while 
the last section draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Wealth effects of old-age security: Theoretical insights, measurement 
problems and empirical findings 
The standard life-cycle model of consumption and wealth accumulation is the 
most convenient benchmark for the analysis of how an individual reallocates 
resources in response to the availability of old-age social security or other forms 
of additional pension wealth. A representative household maximizes lifetime 
utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint, which depends on exogenous cash 
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earnings, pension benefits and given interest rates. The resulting optimal 
consumption and saving path over the whole lifetime implies a complete offset 
between any kind of pension wealth and non-pension private wealth. As Browning 
and Crossley (2001) note this is still the baseline result if the model is taken to the 
data. 
 
Gale (1995) mentions eight sources of measurement biases that can occur in 
empirical analyses: 
1. Controlling for cash earnings instead of total compensation as the sum of cash 
wages and pension benefits: Comparing two individuals with equal cash earnings 
but with different levels of pension wealth, the parameter on pension wealth will 
pick up not only the substitution effect between pension wealth and non-pension 
wealth but also the income effect in total compensation. This can lead to an 
underestimation of the true offset.  
2. Ignoring different life expectancy: If one compares two individuals with the 
same annual pension income and the same retirement age, one can expect that the 
one with a longer life expectancy will have higher pension wealth and also higher 
non-pension wealth.  
3. Omitting retirement age: Generous pension benefits induce workers to retire 
earlier. At the same time they will accumulate more non-pension wealth for a 
longer retirement period.  
4. Omitting age: If one compares two individuals with identical life-cycles, but 
with different ages, the older one will have less pension wealth and less non-
pension wealth than the younger one.  
5. Ignoring endogeneity of pensions with respect to saving behaviour: One can 
expect that individuals who tend to save a lot are also more likely to seek jobs 
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with generous pension plans.  
6. Using pension wealth gross-of-taxes: Measuring pension wealth gross-of-
taxes instead of net-of-taxes can generate underestimation of the offset effect.  
7. Using narrow measures of non-pension wealth: Smaller offsets are generally 
found if narrow measures of non-pension wealth are used. 
8. Measuring pension wealth with error: As pension wealth is difficult to 
measure, estimates with measurement error will bias the offset effect toward  
zero. 
 
So far most empirical evidence in favour of the offset hypothesis comes from 
studies based on US data. It is shown by Gale (1998) that correcting only for the 
first measurement bias with the help of an adjustment factor increases the 
measured offset by almost one half (from 0.523 to 0.77). Correcting for the other 
measurement biases increases the measured offset even further. These results 
seem to confirm the life-cycle model for the US.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, evidence based on survey data for other developed 
countries is available only in the cases of Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. Building on data from five subsequent Israeli Consumer 
Expenditure Surveys between 1968 and 1982, Lavi and Spivak (1999) find offset 
coefficient in Israel lying between 0 and 0.5. Using the Italian Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth for the years 1989 and 1991, Jappelli (1995) finds 
significant displacements effects between social security wealth and private 
wealth in the range of 10 and 20%. Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), analysing the 
effects of the Italian pension reform of 1992, find high offset effects close to the 
estimates by Gale (1998) for individuals in the middle of the life-cycle where 
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liqudity constraints are the least binding. Bottazzi et al. (2006) show that the 
offset effects in Italy are much higher for individuals who are well informed about 
their future pension benefits than for those who are uninformed. Based on the 
Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, Alessie et al. (1997) find even more than full 
displacement for social security retirement benefits, but no displacement for 
occupational pension wealth. Using the CentER Saving Survey, Euwals (2000) is 
able to show, however, that the impact of the Dutch public pension scheme is not 
well identified, while for the occupational pensions there is a negative impact only 
for the highest-income-decile sample. Based on data from the U.K. Family 
Expenditure Survey, Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) find a negative impact of 
the state earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS) on private savings with 
relatively high substitution elasticities for the older age groups, while for the basic 
state pension there is no negative impact. 
 
Only Alessie et al. (1997), Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), Attanasio and 
Rohwedder (2003) as well as Bottazi et al. (2006) make adjustments that correct 
for the important first measurement problem mentioned by Gale (1995), i. e the 
bias from controlling for social security wealth and lifetime cash earnings 
separately.1 From these studies one gets the impression that the size of the offset 
effects differs fundamentally between the US and the UK on the one side, and the 
countries of continental Europe on the other side. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The solution proposed by Bernheim (1987), namely controlling for pension wealth and lifetime 
total compensation instead of lifetime cash earnings, is not a true alternative, since it relies on the 
implicit assumption of a perfect offset; see Gale (1998, p. 713 f.). 
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Evidence on the size of such offset effects in Germany is still extremely rare. In a 
time series analysis Kim (1992) has shown that the effect of public old-age 
security on aggregate private capital accumulation in Germany has been relatively 
low. And we could think of many reasons why market failures and/or bounded 
rational behavior of households has led to only small offset effects. To give just 
one example, it has been conjectured by Feldstein (1995, p. 411) that in most 
European countries the confidence in long-term financial promises of 
governments is much lower than in the US reflecting the experiences with war, 
political disorder and inflation over the last century. Germany has been 
particularly hit by all these developments so that German would consider public 
pension wealth much less secure than private wealth. Liqudity constraints on 
underdeveloped financial markets may also have prevented German households 
from fully substituting private savings by public pension wealth. This is why we 
would expect that even after controlling for possible measurement biases, the 
offset effects in Germany are much less pronounced than in the US or in the UK 
(for the SERPS) or even in other countries of continental Europe.  
 
3. Data  
3.1 Sample size 
The data for our empirical study come from the German Socio-economic Panel 
(GSOEP).2 It is the only panel in Germany that provides at the same time 
information on all the necessary key variables, such as income, non-pension 
wealth and pension wealth. The successive GSOEP waves from 1984 through 
1999 contain data for about 4,500 West German households. GSOEP provides 
rich socio-economic and biographical information, which are necessary for 
                                                     
2 For more information on the GSOEP see www.diw.de/soep. 
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measuring lifetime income and social security wealth. For the selection of our 
sample the following criteria were employed:  
- The household head is in 1988 at the age between 40 and 59 and works as a 
full-time employee longer than 1,000 hours each year from 1986 through 
1990.3 If the spouse earns an income, he or she has to work as an employee, 
too. This excludes households from our sample in which the head or the spouse 
is self-employed. 
- The household head or the spouse was not receiving an old-age pension or a 
widow’s pension in the mandatory German state pension system (“Gesetzliche 
Rentenversicherung”) from 1986 through 1990. We focus on actively working 
households in order to avoid problems that a different saving behaviour of the 
retirees might cause. 
- Households with missing information relevant for calculating pension wealth, 
lifetime income or non-pension wealth are excluded. 
 
Our final sample consists of 776 households with 1,304 individuals of which 746 
are male and 558 are female. 
 
3.2 Household non-pension net wealth 
Data on household non-pension net wealth are available in the GSOEP only for 
1988. They contain the market value of real estate property (including owner-
occupied housing), equity in firms, and financial assets (bank accounts, building 
savings contracts, and stocks and bonds) less unsecured debt. The market value of 
real estate property and equity is coded as a categorical variable. The value of 
financial assets is measured by their exact value if their value is known. Otherwise 
                                                     
3 Excluding the younger employees helps the presence of liquidity constraints to be mitigated. 
Page 8 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 9
it is estimated by categories. We use all these information for a broad measure of 
household non-pension net wealth, because - as explained above - narrow 
measures using just financial assets could cause a significant measurement bias. 
So far, a systematic evaluation of the quality of the GSOEP non-pension wealth 
data does not exist. A comparison by Jürges (2001, p. 396) of the GSOEP wealth 
data with the 1988 Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS), a micro-
census by the Federal Statistical Office that provides about 40,000 household data, 
shows, however, that the GSOEP profile follows the EVS profile rather closely. 
 
For the interest rates until 2005 interest rates for 10 years government bonds are 
used and a constant interest rate of 3.5% is employed for the years thereafter. In 
order to check whether or not our results are sensitive to the future interest rate, an 
interest rate of 5.5% is employed in one of our sensitivity analyses. For the 
calculation of real values we make use of the German consumer price index until 
2005, and a constant value of 2% is assumed for the years after 2005 in 
accordance with implicit inflation target of the European Central Bank. 
 
3.3 Household lifetime income 
Estimating lifetime income is essential for testing the offset hypothesis. 
According to the life-cycle model lifetime income, and not current income, should 
be used for testing possible substitution in saving. Other empirical studies 
estimate lifetime income either based on data from only one year (e.g., Gale 1998) 
or several years (e.g., Jappelli 1995; Euwals 2000). Bernheim (1987) uses panel 
data of a longer time period, but employs a simple extrapolation for estimating 
yearly earnings in the future. We calculate lifetime income by estimating annual 
incomes based on the rich information available in the GSOEP. This econometric 
Page 9 of 28
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 10
estimation method helps to reduce the possible measurement error. 
 
Because annual income data from 1984 through 1999 were available, income 
development for the years excluding this period needs to be calculated for each 
individual. For estimates of annual income before 1984, the activity history by 
years of age provided by GSOEP is used, while for the calculation of annual 
income after 1999 it is assumed that the final information on the economic 
activity and on the kind of occupation also holds true in future years. Following 
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), Kazarosian (1997) and Jürges (2001), our study 
applies the following estimation equation for the annual income functions: 
 
itiitit exE ++= νχln     (1) 
 
In this equation itEln  is the log of net or gross annual income for individual i  
in year t . itx  is a vector of time-varying observable characteristics (including a 
constant) for individual i  in year t , such as a fourth-order polynomial of age, a 
dummy variable for female household heads, the number and the squared number 
of children up to age 16 living in the household, and dummies for 10 kinds of 
occupation. χ  benotes the parameter vector to be estimated. iν  ~ ),0( 2νδN  is 
a time-invariant and unobservable individual specific effect resulting from 
education, gender and unobserved skills. ite  is an error term. A Hausman test 
strongly indicates that individual effects are not uncorrelated to the regressors. 
Therefore the fixed effects estimates can be employed in our study for calculating 
individual annual income. Table 1 shows the estimated determinants of individual 
gross annual income that can then be used for calculation of public pension wealth.  
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< Table 1 > 
 
3.4 Public pension wealth and the adjustment factor 
The calculation of household public pension wealth is higly complicated by the 
extreme complexity of the rules (including the many changes of old rules and the 
introduction of new ones) under which the German social security system 
operates. We assume for simplicity that all employees start drawing their public 
retirement benefits at the age of 66, that they expect benefit rules to remain the 
same in the future, and that public pensions were not taxed in the period under 
consideration. In the appendix we give a more detailed description of how we 
calculated social security pension wealth from the GSOEP data. 
 
As Gale (1998) has noted, an explicit adjustment factor is necessary to correct the 
measured values of social security wealth as long as we control for cash earnings 
and pensions separately. This adjustment factor Q is calculated in the following 
way: 
 
( 1) /( 1)xS xTQ e e= − − .       (2) 
 
In this formula S measures the years under an old-age pension coverage and T is 
the sum of S and the expected remaining lifespan. rx rδρ
−= −  is a discount 
factor that is composed of a long-term interest rate r, a rate of time preference δ  
and a coefficient of risk aversion ρ . In the case of Germany we take r=0.035, 
δ=0.02, ρ=3 as baseline values. The total lifespan is 72 years for male employees 
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and 76 years for females according to the German Death Table in 1986/88 
provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Table 2 gives an overview of values of 
Q that were calculated for German male employees under these assumptions. The 
same procedure was also used to calculate adjustment factors for female 
employees.  
 
< Table 2 >  
 
Table 3 reports the main sample characteristics concerning lifetime income and 
various wealth variables for the 776 households. Because only household heads 
with full-time jobs are considered in our sample, the typical household is 
relatively affluent. Net social security wealth is calculated by subtracting the 
present value of future employee contributions from gross social security wealth. 
Reflecting the generosity of the German state pension system, household social 
security wealth is considerable and an important component of lifetime resources. 
It is striking that household social security wealth is much bigger than household 
non-pension net wealth. This reflects the importance of the social security system 
as a significant source of old-age incomes in Germany. It also implies that a small 
displacement effect could reduce private household assets by a relatively large 
amount. It is also interesting that household non-pension net wealth is almost 10 
times bigger than financial assets. 
 
< Table 3 > 
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4. Specification and regression results 
4.1 Specification 
Following Feldstein and Pellechio (1979), Bernheim (1987) and Gale (1998), our 
study employs the following specification to test for the effects of the public 
pension scheme on household savings in Germany: 
 
,j j
j
W Z P Qα β ε= + +∑      (3) 
 
where the index j = 1, 2 stands for household head and spouse, α  and β  are 
parameters to be estimated, and ε  is an error term. The dependant variable W is 
household non-pension net wealth. Z is a vector of variables including household 
net lifetime income, the age and the squared age of the household head, an 
interaction term between age and income, years of education (averaged over 
household head and spouse), a dummy for the marital status, and the number of 
children. Pj is public pension wealth of the household head or the spouse resulting 
from expected old-age retirement transfers. Qj is the offset factor that should 
correct for the possible estimation bias due to the use of cash earnings instead of 
total compensation. 
 
It should be noted that our empirical specification takes into account most of the 
different sources for potential estimation biases mentioned in section 2. A broad 
measure of non-pension wealth - household non-pension net wealth rather than 
financial assets - is used as the dependent variable, and age is explicitly included 
in the set of explanatory variables. Heterogeneity with regard to choosing jobs 
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with generous pension plans is not a serious problem in this study. Since we focus 
on a social security system which is mandatory for all employees, the households 
in our sample cannot actively influence their pension rights. Measuring pension 
wealth gross- or net-of-taxes should not influence the results because social 
security retirement transfers were tax-exempted in Germany during the relevant 
period. Measurement error in net social security wealth can be avoided in our 
estimation because public pension benefits were calculated from the estimates of 
annual income making use of the rich information in GSOEP and from taking into 
account the relevant regulations in German social security legislation. The 
measurement error due to the use of cash earnings is explicitly corrected by the 
introduction of an offset factor Q. In the following, we present our estimation 
results with and without an adjustment by the offset factor. There remain two 
further sources of a potential measurement bias: differences in life expectancy and 
omission of the effective retirement age. They cannot be taken into account 
directly in our specification because of a lack of exact information in the available 
data, but they are dealt with in our sensitivity analyses.  
 
4.2 Regression results 
Table 4 provides the econometric results of the least absolute deviation (LAD) 
regressions. Because LAD regressions reduce the effect of outliers, they are useful 
in analysing wealth data, which are typically highly skewed (Engen et al 1994, 
p.105). The estimated social security wealth coefficient without adjustment by an 
offset factor is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This 
implies that public pension wealth reduces non-pension wealth, controlling for 
other variables, by 16%. After adjustment the offset effect, which is again 
significant at the 1% level, increases to 22%. The difference between the two 
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estimates is thus more than one third. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
The estimates in Table 5 show a similar pattern for robust regressions. The 
estimated coefficient of public pension wealth without adjustment is again 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. It shows an offset 
effect of 10% for old-age retirement transfers. Adjusting public pension wealth by 
the factor Q again raises the estimated offset to 14%, which amounts to an 
increase of about one third.  
 
< Table 5 > 
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
In order to check whether or not our results are sensitive to the future interest rate 
of 3.5% p.a., we recalculated the regressions on the basis of a future interest rate 
of 5.5% p.a. It turned out that for both LAD and robust regressions the main 
results remain unchanged. The higher interest rate increases the offset effect of 
social security wealth before adjustment to 23% in the LAD regression and to 
14% in the robust regression, while the offset effect after adjustment increases to 
30% in the LAD regression and to 19% in the robust regression, respectively.  
 
Concerning life expectancy GSOEP does not provide any direct information. 
GSOEP contains just a questionnaire “Have you been suffering for at least a year 
or chronically from a certain illness or disability?”. Using this information we 
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included a dummy variable for expected life expectancy in our regressions. It 
turned out that this dummy is statistically insignificant and that the results 
concerning offset effect are not modified. 
 
GSOEP provides a questionnaire about expected retirement age, but there are too 
much missing data. Only 132 household heads answered correctly while 644 did 
not. Therefore it cannot be tested in this study whether or not retirement age 
exercises a major influence on our main results. After all, we find it highly 
plausible – in particular under the German social security regulations - to follow 
Bernheim (1987, p. 297) who regards retirement age as an endogenous variable 
that should not be used as an explanatory variable in regressions such as ours. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our results underline that reactions to social security benefits differ significantly 
between Germany on the one side and the US, the UK as well as other countries 
of continental Europe on the other side. Even after making all possible 
adjustments that could lead to a measurement bias, the offset effect of old-age 
security on private wealth formation in Germany is not higher than 22% in our 
base model. It is interesting to note that our panel analysis thus leads to almost the 
same results as the time-series analysis of wealth effects of the German pension 
system by Kim (1992).  
 
The estimated figures are high enough to make the introduction and enlargement 
of social security benefits responsible for some part of the reduction in German 
aggregate capital formation, but they are certainly not an impressive proof of the 
life-cycle hypothesis. We would rather see our results as supportive to the 
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existence of a particular “German savinggs puzzle” as it was characterized by 
Börsch-Supan et al.(2000, p. 11): “… pensions and health insurance are generous 
and likely to have large crowding out effects, yet German households accumulate 
so much real and financial wealth and do not appear to draw it down.”  
 
Feldstein (1995, p. 411) conjectured that given the particular historical and 
institutional setting of social policy in continental Europe, state provided social 
security could not be considered a full substitute for private wealth formation. 
Explanations of the Geman savings puzzle (Börsch-Supan 1992, Schnabel 1999) 
point out that the high growth of pension income during the mid 1950s has come 
as a total surprise to those generations of the war and inter-war times who were 
not able to change their intertemporal consumption preferences rapidly enough. 
Household heads in our sample have been born between 1929 and 1948. Their 
consumption and saving habits have thus been formed under the experience or in 
the close memory of extreme political and economic disorder, so that the low 
confidence in long-term financial promises of the government (or even their 
overfullfilment) should not be too surprising. However, younger generations that 
have grown up under the stable economic and political conditions after World 
War II behave differently so that the aggregate offset effect can be expected to 
increase. Future research will have to prove this conjecture.
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Appendix  
In this study social security wealth is calculated in the same way as in the survey 
report “Altersvorsorge in Deutschland 1996 (AVID 1996)” by the Verband 
Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (VDR) (1999).4 It is assumed that the 
insured start drawing their standard old-age pension at the age of 66 and that their 
further lifetime follows the pattern of the German Death Table (“Allgemeine 
Sterbetafel”) in 1986/88 provided by the Federal Statistical Office. In accordance 
with AVID (1996), a widow’s or a widower’s pension is not calculated and a 
value of zero is put for the pension benefits, if their minimum contribution period 
of five years is not completed.  
 
First, the monthly amount of a pension at the retirement age is estimated for each 
individual. The process of calculating the monthly pension in Germany is 
extremely complex. Thus we briefly explain how we estimated the monthly 
pension based on the following formula:   
 
Monthly Pension =G T C× ×   
 
where G is personal earnings points, T is pension type factor and C is current 
monthly pension value.  
 
Income up to the contribution assessment limit for each year is divided by the 
average income of all insured persons and is converted into personal earnings 
points. These values and other credited values are summed up for all insured 
                                                     
4 For more information on AVID 1996 see www.altervorsorge-in-
deutschland.de/AVID96/avid96.html. 
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periods. Periods, which are acquired by paying insurance contributions, are 
contributions periods. Periods, which are spent raising children and providing 
military or civilian service, also count as contribution periods. One personal 
earnings point is given to a child-raising parent for the first year following the 
birth of a child. Child-raising periods from the age of two through ten can be 
useful for pension entitlement, if a child-raising parent is unemployed during this 
time. One personal earnings point also applies for the period of military or civilian 
service. In addition the lesser of a value corresponding 75% of a personal average 
earnings point before this adjustment or of a 0.75 earnings point is granted for 
each year to a maximum of three years spent in vocational training that was 
conducted by the age of 25. The same regulation also applies for full-time 
education from the 18th birthday. 
 
Pension type factor is a factor that depends on the kinds of pension. For example, 
a value of one is given for the standard old-age pension. Current monthly pension 
value is the monthly pension that an average earner is expected to receive for one 
year. It is adjusted each year. For future monthly pensions, estimates in 
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (BMA) (2000) are employed. 
 
Second, on the basis of the estimated monthly pension, the expected amount of 
annual pensions for the entire retirement period is measured. Then the present 
value of social security pension wealth at the retirement age is calculated using 
the following formula.  
 
,i tPW =
, , ,
66
66 (1 )
z
i k i t k
k
k
A SP
r −=
⋅
+∑  
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,i tP  is expected value of social security pension wealth for individual i  in the 
retirement year t . z  is the maximum attainable age. ,i kA  stands for the annual 
value of old-age pension benefits for individual i  at age k  and ktiSP ,,  for 
gender-specific probability in year t  of survival for individual i  until the age of 
k . r  is the real interest rate. Finally estimates of social security pension wealth 
for each employee are measured in DM values of 1988. 
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Table 1: Regression results for individual gross annual incomes  
Independent variables 
Coefficients 
(t-values in 
parentheses) 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficients 
(t-values in 
parentheses) 
Constant -14.688 (-6.72) Occupation1 0.427 (24.55) 
Age1 21.796 (11.59) Occupation2 0.481 (32.32) 
Age2 -7.327 (12.20) Occupation3 0.527 (30.79) 
Age3 1.097 (13.01) Occupation4 0.552 (20.29) 
Age4 -0.061 (13.93) Occupation5 0.555 (13.57) 
Female household head 0.121 (3.51) Occupation6 0.552 (15.87) 
Children1 -0.049 (-4.56) Occupation7 0.496 (27.07) 
Children2 0.003 (1.08) Occupation8 0.561 (31.04) 
  Occupation9 0.622 (27.46) 
  Occupation10 0.692 (17.54) 
R2 0.197 
Number of observations 1,304 
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the adjustment factor Q for German male employees 
Current age Age when pension 
coverage began 40 45 50 55 60 
20 0.571 0.668 0.751 0.823 0.885 
25 0.478 0.597 0.698 0.785 0.860 
30 0.362 0.506 0.630 0.737 0.828 
35 0.208 0.387 0.540 0.673 0.787 
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Table 3: Household lifetime income and wealth 
Household lifetime income and wealth  
(in DM values of 1988) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation
Household net lifetime income 1,290,586 511,287 
net 259,794 133,941 
Household social security wealth 
gross 320,560 134,718 
Household non-pension net wealth  146,755 229,313 
Financial assets 14,988 24,626 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of non-pension net wealth in the LAD regression 
Coefficients 
(t-values in parentheses) Independent variables 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Constant -13.906 (-2.97) -14.771 (-3.24) 
Household net lifetime income  
(in DM values of 1988) 
0.049 (1.09) 0.044 (0.98) 
Age  5.331 (2.78) 5.638 (3.02) 
Age2 -0.542 (-2.75) -0.569 (-2.96) 
Years of education 0.076 (2.24) 0.075 (2.28) 
Age-income interaction 0.013 (3.69) 0.014 (3.92) 
Married 0.443 (2.70) 0.423 (2.63) 
Number of children -0.080 (-1.43) -0.076 (-1.38) 
Net social security wealth -0.162 (-3.47) -0.218 (-3.48) 
Pseudo 2R  0.071 0.071 
Number of observations 776 776 
Note: Variables are measured in the following units: non-pension wealth, household lifetime 
income, and social security wealth divided by 100,000, age is divided by 10 and age-income 
interaction is divided by 106. 
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Table 5: Determinants of non-pension net wealth in the robust regression 
Note: Variables are measured in the following units: non-pension wealth, household lifetime 
income, and social security wealth are divided by 100,000, age is divided by 10 and age-income 
interaction is divided by 106. 
 
Coefficients 
(t-values in parentheses) Independent variables 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Constant -10.581 (-2.69) -10.615 (-2.70) 
Household net lifetime income 
(in DM values of 1988) 
0.036 (0.95) 0.027 (0.71) 
Age  4.117 (2.56) 4.116 (2.56) 
Age2 -0.407 (-2.45) -0.405 (-2.44) 
Years of education 0.054 (1.89) 0.053 (1.88) 
Age-income interaction 0.007 (2.17) 0.007 (2.27) 
Married 0.528 (3.82) 0.527 (3.81) 
Number of children -0.089 (-1.85) -0.089 (-1.85) 
Net social security wealth -0.103 (-2.64) -0.136 (-2.53) 
F(8, 767) 10.16 10.02 
Number of observations 776 776 
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Table 6: Determinants of non-pension net wealth in the LAD regression 
based on a future interest rate of 5.5% p.a.  
Coefficients 
(t-values in parentheses) Independent variables 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Constant -14.483 (-3.39) -14.867 (-3.06) 
Household net lifetime income  
(in DM values of 1988) 
0.026 (0.58) 0.017 (0.33) 
Age  5.524 (3.16) 5.690 (2.86) 
Age2 -0.558 (-3.10) -0.577 (-2.81) 
Years of education 0.075 (2.41) 0.075 (2.10) 
Age-income interaction 0.014 (4.22) 0.015 (3.96) 
Married 0.424 (2.82) 0.406 (2.36) 
Number of children -0.074 (-1.42) -0.072 (-1.23) 
Net social security wealth -0.230 (-3.72) -0.296 (-3.15) 
Pseudo 2R  0.071 0.071 
Number of observations 776 776 
Note: Variables are measured in the following units: non-pension wealth, household lifetime 
income, and social security wealth are divided by 100,000, age is divided by 10 and age-income 
interaction is divided by 106. 
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Table 7: Determinants of non-pension net wealth in the robust regression 
based on a future interest rate of 5.5% p.a.  
Coefficients 
(t-values in parentheses) Independent variables 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Constant -10.641 (-2.72) -10.233 (-2.62) 
Household net lifetime income  
(in DM values of 1988) 
0.024 (0.60) 0.020 (0.49) 
Age  4.101 (2.56) 3.916 (2.44) 
Age2 -0.402 (-2.43) -0.381 (-2.30) 
Years of education 0.054 (1.91) 0.053 (1.88) 
Age-income interaction 0.007 (2.21) 0.007 (2.26) 
Married 0.520 (3.77) 0.519 (3.77) 
Number of children -0.086 (-1.80) -0.086 (-1.82) 
Net social security w alth -0.141 (-2.48) -0.188 (-2.50) 
F(8, 767) 10.01 9.92 
Number of observations 776 776 
Note: Variables are measured in the following units: non-pension wealth, household lifetime 
income, and social security wealth are divided by 100,000, age is divided by 10 and age-income 
interaction is divided by 106. 
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